Post-Conflict Military Integration Models: A Case Study Of the Establishment Of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)

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Abstract	Article Info
This article seeks to examine the processes and procedures undertaken by the South African political and military negotiators, and the military integration model which was followed in order to achieve a peaceful and successful integration of the various military regimes existing in the country pre-1994 to form the 'national defence force', the SANDF. This is an explorative article which draws its data from an extensive literature review on existing military integration models. This article seeks to recommend a model which South Africa (SA) used during its military integration process. In the South African situation, the Truth and Reconciliation model was used after the first democratic elections in 1994 as a way to foster peace and reconciliation amongst the victims and perpetrators from the apartheid era. This model is recommended for use by countries undergoing similar integration processes elsewhere in the world.	

INTRODUCTION

The peaceful integration and formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is one of the best practices and a success story of the democratization of the South African State. At the beginning of the political negotiation process leading to the democratisation of the South African State there were a number of armed formations in the country ranging from the South African Defence Force (SADF); Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK); the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA); and the proxy armies of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC States). It was, therefore, a concern that that there was a potential that armed clashes could take place between the SADF and the TBVC States armies on the one hand, and the liberation armies which may then derail the negotiations and lead to a civil war.

Civil wars, insurgency, and ethnic conflict continue to plague countries around the world. Unfortunately, neither the "victory" of one group nor "negotiated" settlement of the conflict necessarily results in an end to violence. Violence may resurface if losing factions or minority groups conclude that they have lost power or have been excluded from the political process (Ruhunga, 2006).When the political and military negotiation processes for the democratisation of SA and the accompanying integration of the armed forces in SA began, it was difficult for the political principals to guarantee that the various armed forces will not embark on military campaigns or activities to undermine political stability. One of the negotiation and integration challenges, therefore, was to ensure that the different armed forces were monitored and kept under control during and after the political negotiation process and more especially after the outcome of the democratic elections, (Southall, 1992 and Rapp, 1995).

The peaceful and successful integration of the seven-armed formations to form the SANDF is one of the 'best practices' of the negotiated political settlement of modern political state– especially on the African continent. This amazing result was achieved without the intervention, supervision or facilitation of any external force such as a United Nations (UN) Peace-keeping force or any such force. This brought to the fore, then, a notion of a 'home- brewed' South African contribution to the discourse of implementing successful post-conflict military integration. The next section discusses the research methodology used in this article.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: EXPLORATORY RESEARCH APPROACH

The article seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the integration process in SA. Therefore, the article uses an exploratory research approach whereby studies are a valuable means of finding out 'what is happening'. They seek new insights and ask relevant questions to assess phenomenon in a new light. This article focuses on identifying patterns, ideas or hypotheses rather than testing or confirming of any hypotheses (Saunders, 1997). Exploratory research provides greater understanding of a concept. It crystallizes a problem, rather than providing precise measurement or quantification. The focus of such qualitative research is not on numbers but on words and observations, visual portrayals, meaningful characterizations, interpretations, and other expressive descriptions (Zikmund, 2003).

The article also seeks to explore the data without adopting a theoretical or descriptive framework and also seeks to develop a conceptual framework to guide subsequent work. When a researcher adopts and commences the article in this manner it is referred to as an inductive perspective. This perspective, accordingly, seeks to build a theory grounded in a number of relevant cases. This approach is, therefore, referred to as grounded research approach (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013).

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GROUNDED THEORY

The theory to be developed or presented as part of the findings of this article is grounded in that it is developed form the data, as opposed to being suggested by the literature; that is: theory is an expected outcome from, rather than a starting point for the article. In this sense, therefore, 'theory' is an explanation of the

commonalities and the relationships among observed phenomenon in terms of the casual structures and processes that are presumed to underlie them (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013; Welman, Kruger and Mitchell: 2005). Grounded theorists start with broad research questions that provide the freedom and flexibility to explore a phenomenon in depth. The research questions identify the general focus for the article and tend to be action and process oriented and depending on the information gathered the researcher attends to different aspects during analysis. Thus grounded theorists, like all researchers try to find answers that are important but not yet answered (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013; Babbie and Mouton 2012).

Welman et al (2005) outline the following as aspects of grounded theory:
1. Grounded theory is an inductive approach;
2. Theory emerges from the process of data collection;
3. The theorists do not commence the article with any theoretical framework;

Theorists identify relationships between the data and develop questions and hypotheses to test these.
Grounded theorists aim to contribute to the development of theory by using multiple stages of data collection and the refinement and interrelationships of categories of information. The theorists aim to identify and describe these plausible relationships among concepts and sets of concepts. Grounded theorists try to find answers to questions that are important but not yet answered and aim to contribute to the development of theory. An important assumption underlying this approach is that 'all of the concepts pertaining to a given phenomenon have not yet been identified, at least not in this population or place; or if so, then the relationships between the concepts are poorly understood or conceptually underdeveloped (Babbie and Mouton 2012).

The peaceful integration and formation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was an expected outcome since there was immeasurable hostility amongst various armed forces in South Africa. It was, therefore, a concern that that there was a potential that armed clashes could take place between the SADF and the liberation armies which may then derail the negotiations and lead to a civil war. It is against this backdrop that this article uses grounded theory as its conceptual framework in order to try to find answers that are important but not yet answered (Welman et al 2005). The next section will discuss various military integration models which can be used by various countries in order to achieve a peaceful transition.

MILITARY INTEGRATION MODELS

The first body of literature on reconciliation divides into two conceptual models: the individual reconciliation model and the national unity and reconciliation model (NUR). The individual reconciliation model involves two individuals, a victim and a perpetrator, coming together to discuss crimes committed against the former. Also known as the Truth and Reconciliation model, this model operates on a religious paradigm, which emphasizes a religious conversion mode of confession, repentance, and forgiveness (Ruhunga 2006). According to Lederach, (2001) the hatred and prejudice of racial xenophobia are primary factors and motivators of conflict. Thus, their transformation must be rooted in social psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside of the competency of international diplomacy. Borer (2001) argues that post-conflict reconstruction requires individual reconciliation, a bottom-up approach or grassroots mechanism to foster peace-building and reconciliation.

In the South African situation, the Truth and Reconciliation model was used after the first democratic elections in 1994 as a way to foster peace and reconciliation amongst the victims and perpetrators from the apartheid era. This model was used for the integration of the society and communities and less used for military integration. The most relevant model which South Africa used was the second model of national unity and reconciliation which is discussed in detail below.

The second model of reconciliation is that of national unity and reconciliation.
Borer (2001) argues that the unit of analysis in NUR is not an individual acceptance but rather is anchored in social-political institutions and processes, termed as political paradigm. This model calls for the commitment

of victims and perpetrators to respect the law, procedures, and processes that are laid down by the country's constitution. The process is a top-down approach to reconciliation and peace building, involving senior military, political and religious leaders. The success of this model depends on the ability of peacemakers, often seen as intermediaries or mediators, normally backed by supporting governments or the United Nations. The mediator's role is to encourage communities to accept reconciliation. This model is hierarchical, and requires a functional power structure. It assumes that the accomplishments at the high level will be accepted by the rest of the population (Ruhunga 2006).

South Africa used this model in its military integration process whereby military groups, political parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) and other became part of negotiation process. The then National Party under the leadership of P.W. De Klerk provided a functional power structure.

The third model of reconciliation is what Lederach (1999) calls a "middle-out" approach to peace-building that appeals to ethnic and religious leaders as well as to NGOs, academics, and intellectuals. The middle range leaders occupy a determinant position in the society and, if properly integrated, might provide legitimacy for the process of reconciliation and sustainable peace. This approach argues that theories and strategies be focused on the middle range leadership that can be influential in attempts to end internal, protracted conflicts. This approach was also applied to negotiations in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s. Rwanda also adopted the national unity and reconciliation model and established a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission to oversee the reconciliation process. The government is responsible for calming ethnic hatred, eradicating the culture of impunity, and uniting Rwandan society (Ruhunga 2006).

The fourth model deals with the aspect of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and integration (DDRI) of ex-combatants. A DDRI program has different models designed for different situations. Those models are conducted in two main phases: the short-medium phase that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization and integration process of ex-combatants, and the long-term phase that deals with reintegration process of ex-combatants into civilian life. The first DDRI model is the consent-based model. This model is based on a comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties and is usually conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb some guerrilla forces or they merge the two warring factions to form a single national military force (Smith 1999).

In seeking post-conflict reconciliation, whether adopting an individual or national reconciliation model, countries need to determine what sort of justice they will seek: retributive or restorative. The retributive model is a typical system of justice based on retaliation for a crime. Smith (1999) argues that this is not a type of justice applicable in post- conflict situations where many people have been killed and the entire country is in dire need for peace and reconciliation. South Africa chose the restorative model of reconciliation which encouraged forgiving those that have done wrong and reconciliation.

The second body of literature postulates that there are three models of military integration which includes the following:

Consent-based model

The first is the consent- based model, which is based on comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties conducted under third party supervision. The government forces may absorb guerrilla forces or may merge the two warring factions to form a single national force. It is important to note that the peace-building is usually conducted after cessation of hostilities though the security situation may remain fragile (Southall, 1992).

Demobilisation model

The second model is complete demobilization model where the government decides to downsize its military through the normal channels of peace-building but does not include former enemy combatants in its forces. Examples include the 1991 Ethiopia complete demobilization of the former government forces under the DERG after the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam (Southall, 1992).

Coercive model
The third model is the coercive model which involves forced disarmament of insurgents and is usually carried out by external intervention under a United Nations mandate. An example of this is the failed forced disarmament of Somali warring factions in 1993 (Southall, 1992).
The next section gives a detailed discussion on the integration process in South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
The integration of the seven armed forces in existence in SA at the time of the negotiations process was preceded by and influenced by many factors which eventually contributed to its successful execution. Some of these factors included the following:
Pre-negotiation talks both in and outside SA;
Political developments both internally and externally to SA, including the formation of the Union Democratic Front (UDF) and the Harare Declaration;
The direct talks between members of the South African Defense Force and UMkhonto We Sizwe (MK);
Political direction from the Transitional Executive Council through the Sub-Council of Defence and the discussions at the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (Ratsomo 2012).

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION INSTRUMENTS
Once the process of negotiations reaches consensus there is a need to establish negotiating bodies which will be allocated various tasks and roles during the negotiation process. The following bodies were established as part of the negotiation process (Ratsomo 2012):

The Transitional Executive Council
The military integration process negotiation was, at all relevant times, subjected to the political negotiation process through the Multi Party Negotiating Forum and its sub-structure, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC).
The establishment of the TEC was an important step in the process of levelling the playing field and in creating conditions under which all parties could negotiate as equals. The TEC, firstly, provided for a mechanism for the co-governing of the country by all parties and played a significant part as a credible neutral force that kept the armed formations in check. In this manner, the fear of a coup or the security forces taking over the country after the elections was forestalled.

The Sub-Council for Defence (SCD)
The SCD was a platform from which political parties could monitor and oversee the military negotiation process and for the political parties to direct, advise and be consulted on matters of national importance. When such negotiations are in process there should be a political commitment and guidance to the process and where the military fails to reach consensus the politicians should intervene. This meant that military personnel were not left all by its own to take decisions. After all, war is politics by other means.

The Joint Multi Co-ordinating Council (JMCC)
The JMCC became the umbilical cord between the politicians and military personnel. It acted as the implementation body of the decisions of the SCD and, importantly, provided military personnel with the necessary space and time to hammer out the finer points, fine-tune the rough-edges and to produce a synthesized product and transformed ideas of how the military, the new single and integrated national defence force should be structured through the discussions at the JMCC.

In this manner, all military participants had a platform from which to participate and influence decisions, and it was designed like this by the political heads of the military formations. To re- affirm the point, the military integration process negotiation was, at all relevant times, subjected to the political negotiation process through the MPNF and its sub-structures, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and the SCD. The connection, therefore, between politics and military was always maintained and there was a symbiotic and mutual interchange and inter-penetration of ideas from the politicians and the military.

The Certified Personnel Register

The agreement to use the CPR as the departure point for integration into the SANDF was an important aspect of the integration process and that notion has outlived the integration process as the process unfolds and benefits are provided to military veterans. As it stood and as it stands today, only those appearing on the CPR were eligible to enlist. The implementation of the CPR meant that no ghost or rogue soldiers could find easily find their way into the SANDF and consequently defraud the system.

More importantly, the CPR became and has become a legitimate point of reference which cannot be disputed – even at the stage when the Department of Military Veterans, the sister department to the Department of Defence, was compiling a list of military veterans.

The British Military Advisory Task Team (BMATT)

In many countries BMATT was utilised for the training of soldiers. In SA, however, BMATT was used as an arbiter and mediator during disputes of qualifications and rank. Much as many former guerrilla combatants were not happy with their ranks and the evaluation of their qualifications, the existence of an external, neutral body ameliorated the anger and the frustrations that may have been experienced or voiced by those concerned. According to Ruhunga (2006) the traditional military integration models were designed either to disband the defeated enemy forces, or to integrate ex-combatants.

where the fighting has not been conclusive. In cases whereby there was exclusion of ex- combatants has resulted in renewed conflict. As a result, in the South African situation, the seven armed forces had representatives in the TEC so as to ensure that they were all represented during the negotiations. This was one of the positive moves which ensured the success of the integration process. The next discussion will focus in detail the success of the military integration in South Africa.

KEY INTEGRATION SUCCESS FACTORS

According to Ratsomo (2012), the following factors are highlighted as having been instrumental in the way political and military negotiations were conducted.

Bi-lateral negotiations

The literature indicates that the ANC and the South African Government (SAG) started talking and negotiating bilaterally before the unbanning of the ANC when Nelson Mandela was still in prison and the ANC was still in exile. What the literature reveals is that when opportunities arose for talks and negotiations the two parties took those and used them to sound each other until they found a common ground which then led to talks and negotiations in the open and the subsequent involvement of the rest of SA in the negotiations as demonstrated in the formation of Convention for a Democratic South Africa and the Multi- Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) after the SAG/ANC bilateral talks. The conclusion of the Record of Understanding and the immediate establishment of the MPNF after this demonstrated the importance of clearing controversial and sticky issues between the two main parties before multi-party negotiations could commence.

The establishment of peace structures

The establishment of the National Peace Accord (NPA) and the National Peace- Keeping Force (NPKF) were important conceptions of the SA negotiators. These structures were a demonstration of the negotiating parties to peaceful resolution of their problems. More importantly was the message to their supporters that peace had to be achieved at all levels of society.

Keeping to the strategic objective

The ANC had a strategic objective of defeating apartheid and ushering a new democratic dispensation in SA based on majority rule. In the course of its conduct of the struggle the ANC ensued that it does not lose sight of this aspect and for tactical reasons it was prepared to give concessions to certain issues.

The ANC adopted a strategic approach to negotiations and they produced smart and impeccable rational positions such as the Harare Declaration. In this regard, the organisation positioned itself as the leader in the negotiating process and as the deliverer and guarantor of the defeat of an injustice system of apartheid abhorred by all. Once these were accepted, the ANC moved up the moral high ground pedestal.

ANC's suspension of armed forces
This particular assertion should be considered and understood in the context that the ANC had a record of more than fifty years of what Albert Luthuli says had been knocking at the closed and barred door. The ANC had resorted to armed struggle as a continuation of politics by other means at a time when the doors for political dialogue where closed. It stands to reason, then that if the doors were truly open for the ANC to enter and sit at the negotiating table as an equal to the SA government then they had to utilise the opportunity. The ANC formally disbanded MK only in December 1994 (Maharaj, 2000).

Proposal of the sunset clause
The proposal of the sunset clause was also a tactical move aimed at allaying the fears of the civil service, including the security forces and the white minority in general. After its adoption the negotiations moved forward after they had stalled for some time.

Bolstering the stature and membership of MK members
The ANC was quick to adopt a strategy to bolstering the stature and membership of MK by introducing ranks and sending combatants for training and retraining. In this case, the ANC realised that its members would be disadvantaged if they were to be integrated without ranks but also that they should be able to hold their own somewhat against their South African Defence Force peers in terms of competency and numbers.
Military integration depends on political and military will to make it a success. The above discussion bears testimony to this factor.

CONCLUSION
The authors conclude that, South Africa had a mixture of three different reconciliation models at varying degrees and intervals during the military integration process. Firstly, South Africa used the national unity and reconciliation model with a mixture of consent model whereby the armed guerilla forces opposing the then apartheid regime and the then existing conventional national defense force merged and became one unit which is now called the SANDF. Secondly, South Africa also used the Truth and Reconciliation model whereby the victims and perpetrators had a chance to sit on the same table, talk and forgive each other. Thirdly, South Africa also used the "middle – out model whereby ethnic and religious leaders as well as to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), academics, and intellectuals contributed to the peace-building process. The middle range leaders occupy a determinant position in the society and, if properly integrated, might provide legitimacy for the process of reconciliation and sustainable peace.
In conclusion, this article postulates that South Africa's successful military integration was due firstly, to the direct linking of the political negotiation process and the utilisation of three varying models in order to attain success. This article recommends a model which South Africa (SA) used to other countries elsewhere in the world facing similar problems and involved in the post-conflict military integration.

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